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Abstract
Strong articial life research is often thought to rely on Alife
systems as sources of novel empirical data. It is hoped that
by augmenting our observations of natural life, thisnovel data
can help settle empirical questions, and thereby separate fun-
damental properties of living systems from those aspects that
are merely contingent on the idiosyncrasies of terrestrial evo-
lution. Some authors have questioned whether this approach
can be pursued soundly in the absence of a prior, agreed-upon
denition of life. Here we compare Alife's position to that of
more orthodox empirical tools that nevertheless suffer from
strong theory-dependence. Drawing on these examples, we
consider what kind of justication might be needed to under-
write articial life as empirical enquiry.
In the title of the rst international articial life con-
ference, held over a decade and a half ago, two streams
of Alife research were identiedthe synthesis of life-like
or living systems versus their simulation. This distinction
was perhaps intended to echo that made between strong and
weak articial intelligence, a division that has been readily
adopted by the Alife community. While strong AI or Alife
is concerned with building bona de examples of real intel-
ligence or real life, the weak strand of research is concerned
with improving our understanding of intelligence and life
via theconstructionofmodelsorreplicas ofnaturalsystems.
While thelatterbranchofresearchis understoodas anortho-
dox type of scientic or engineering methodology, the for-
mer has often been regarded as more problematic. How can
we create genuine instances of intelligence and life without
a prior understanding of what constitutes valid membership
of either category?
In this paper we will not consider what constitutes a def-
inition of life, or what it is to be alive. We will assume that
such questions are being pursued by others. Rather, we will
be interested in a related question: what would have to be
true of the relationship between articial and natural life for
it to be the case that observations of (computational) Alife
systems could be legitimately employed to settle empirical
questions regarding the nature of life?
The root of the problem is hinted at by the suggestion
of deception, falsity or unreality that can sometimes be de-
tected in the meanings of both synthetic and simulated. We
can clarify this hint by considering two distinct meanings of
the term articial.
First, the word articial can be used to describe a man-
made example of something natural (hereafter denoted
Articial1). Articial light, for example, is typically real,
actual light that is manufactured rather than generated natu-
rally by the sun, or forest res, or bioluminescence of some
kindbut these are all instances of the same physical phe-
nomenon. By contrast, the wordarticial can also be used to
describesomethingthat has been designed,perhaps through
artice of some kind, to closely resemble something else
(hereafter denoted Articial2). For example, an articial
lime avouring, E555, might have been designed to taste
like real lime, but is in fact not an instance of the real taste
of lime even if it tastes indistinguishablefrom the real thing.
Notethatwhetherornotarticiallightorlime canbeusedto
settle empirical questions regarding real light or lime hinges
critically upon which denition of articial is understood to
apply.
Which meaning of the word articial is justied in a par-
ticular case depends upon what criteria we feel must be met
in order for something to count as a true instance of a par-
ticular category. In the case of light, we have a physical the-
ory that allows us to lump together sunlight, relight, torch-
light, electric light-bulb light, etc., into one category: real
light. Given this, we are in a position to pursue strong ar-
ticial light research, discovering new ways of generating
new kinds of light. Weak articial light research could in-
vestigateways of producingthe appearanceoflight viacon-
structingmodelsoflight(whichinvolvenolightthemselves)
or perhaps fake lighting (e.g., ways of painting a room or a
picture to suggest the presence of light). In doing so, we
might learn about how light works and why it appears to us
in the ways that it does.
In the case of lime avours, we have a less well-specied
but widely agreed upon notion that the avour of real lime
fruit cannot be lumped together with some avouring E555
in a category called real lime avour, no matter how con-
vincinglylimey E555 happens to taste (unless perhaps E555is derived directly and straightforwardly from real limes, or
can be proven to be chemically identical to real lime). In
this situation, weak articial lime researchers could legit-
imately concern themselves with producing avourings that
resemble real lime in some way. Through this type of re-
search, we might discover a lot of the chemistry, biology
and psychologyof what makes things taste like lime. Strong
articial lime research is a little more problematic, however,
and we will return to why this is a little later.
What is important to notice about this exampleis not sim-
ply that some categories, such as tastes, are subjective, but
rather that some are as yet unsupported by some scientic
account. The appearance of light is extremely subjective,
yet we are able to objectively account for both the perceived
variety of different forms of light and their unity through
recourse to a physical theory. By contrast, the absence of
such a theoretical account of lime avour prevents us from
achieving a similar understanding.
In this paper we consider what kind of framework could
underwritestrong articial life as an empirical pursuit, since
it is through the promise of generating useful empirical data
that strong articial life typically gains its strongest support.
Empirical Alife
In their seminal paper, Alan Newell and Herb Simon (1976)
provide an account intended to underwrite articial intelli-
gence as a kind of empirical enquiry into the nature of intel-
ligence. This account reduces to a pair of working hypothe-
ses:
1. A physicalsymbol system has the necessary andsuf-
cient means for intelligent action.
2. A suitably programmedcomputer is an example of a
physical symbol system.
The extent to which Newell and Simon were successful is
debatable,butit remainsthecasethatnocomparable,widely
adopted framework has been forthcoming within articial
life. However, the absence of such an account has not pre-
vented Alife practitioners from arguing that their work is a
form of empirical enquiry. In particular, it has been sug-
gested that computer simulations of living systems could be
used to settle empirical questions concerning life itself.
For example, Bedau (1998) considers a thought exper-
iment proposed by Gould (1989). What would happen,
Gould asks, if we could rewind the universe, to a point in
timebeforetheadventoflifeonearth. Ifwegavetheprimor-
dial soup a quick stir and then let time run forward again to
the year 2004, what would we see on the face of the planet?
Would we see creatures much the same as ourselves, and
dogsandcats andlice andlichen? Or,as hesuggests, is there
no reason to suppose that we would not see utterly different
life-forms? For Gould, this is a thought experiment about
contingency. For Bedau it is an opportunity for Alife to set-
tle an empirical question. By formulating a suitable simula-
tion, one that manifests important, fundamentalproperties
ofevolutionandlife, and repeatedlyrunningthis simulation,
we would be able to observe and record the variety of arti-
cial life-forms that evolve, their regularities and diversity.
We would then be able to answer Gould without having to
rely on our, rather puny, imaginations.
This type of use for Alife systems has been argued for
by a number of authors (Bonabeau & Theraulaz, 1994; Ray,
1994; Taylor & Jefferson, 1994; Miller, 1995) who claim
that evolutionary biologists face a problem in that they pos-
sess scant evidence with which to reconstruct the evolution
oflifeonearth. Suchevidenceincludesthefossilrecord,and
our limited observations of the species that currently sur-
round us. Compounding this claimed paucity of raw data,
the authors point out that any evidence that biologists do
possess can only be the result of one evolutionary sequence,
sincelifehas (presumably)onlyevolvedonceonearth. With
only terrestrial life to draw upon in constructing theories to
explain phenomena associated with life, biologists are un-
able to distinguish between aspects of life which are con-
tingent upon the particular historical development of life on
earth,andthoseaspectswhicharefundamentaltolifeingen-
eral.
For these authors, then, one promise of articial life is to
offer whole new datasets which can be examined alongside
the one provided by natural evolution. But this approach
to empirical Alife is not without its problems. Consider an
anecdoteintendedto revealthe empiricalpowerofcomputer
simulation, as presented by Casti (1997) in his book Would-
be Worlds: How Simulation is Changing the Frontiers of
Science.
Casti describes a particular real sporting event (a Super
Bowl game) in which the unfancied American football team
happened to beat the favourite. Was the underdog simply
lucky, Casti wonders? If the same teams had played again,
say 100 times, would the same team have won? Pundits and
fans will of course never know for sure since there is only
a single data point upon which to base any argument (the
actual game as it was played). The data massively under-
determines the hypotheses. But wait! Casti introduces the
reader to the existence of an American football computer
game in which one can force the computer to control both
teams (the user merely watches the game unfold). By re-
running the Super Bowl many times, with the same teams
andsameweatherconditions,etc., Casti generatesaseries of
new data points. On the basis of this data, he conrms that,
indeed,the underdoghadnot merelybeenlucky,since under
the highlycontrolled conditionscreated by the simulation, it
won statistically more often than it lost. This story encapsu-
lates the proposed role for simulation as an empirical tool,
lling in missing or incomplete data sets and thereby help-
ing to settle empirical questions. But how valid are these
new data points? Can they even be classed as data at all?Imagine that Casti's computergame had been released af-
ter theSuperBowl thathe is re-creating. Couldit notbe pos-
sible, perhaps even highly probable, that the game program-
mers had noted the outcomeof the SuperBowl, and tinkered
with the computer program such that it tended to replicate
this important result? If that were the case, through his con-
trolled experiment, Casti would have discovered something
about the ideas of the computer game programmers, not
about the teams simulated by the computer game. Even if
the computergame had beenreleased before the Super Bowl
in question had been played, ensuring that the programmers
could not have been inuenced by its result, the program-
mers could (must?) have been inuenced by other results.
How could Casti control for this inuence? The program-
mers themselves may not have understood the idiosyncratic
biases that they had perhaps inadvertently included in the
game. Surely these biases and suchlike render the simula-
tion moribund, at least as a source of empirical data?
Some authors (e.g., Di Paolo, Noble, & Bullock, 2000)
have argued that Alife simulations cannot be considered to
be sources of empirical data precisely because they are so
loaded with the tacit pre-theoretical biases of their creators,
coloured by their ideas, and polluted by their opinions. But
does philosophy of science not tell us that all observations
are theory-loaded in this way? When considering this prob-
lem with empirical science, Chalmers (1999) reaches the
following conclusion:
...howeverinformedbytheoryanexperimentis, there
is a strong sense in which the results of an experiment
are determined by the world and not by the theories,
and we cannot make [the] outcomes conform to our
theories. (Chalmers, 1999, pp.3940).
Can these claims really be made of computer programs?
In this paper we will explore what would have to be true for
these constraints to hold in the case of strong articial life.
But rst, we will considertwoexamplesofapparentlyortho-
dox empirical science in order to discoverthe ways in which
articially generated data take part in regular science.
Trans-Cranial Magnetic Stimulation
Research into brain function often employs patients who
have sufferedbrain damage throughstrokes or head injuries.
Brains are examined to determine which areas are damaged,
and associations between these damagedareas and the func-
tional decits exhibited by the patients are postulated. The
technique of trans-cranial magnetic stimulation, known as
TCMS or TMS, has allowed psychology researchers to ex-
tend the scope of this approach through generating tempo-
rary articial strokes in normal, healthy patients.
TMS machinery consists of a set of electrodes that are
placed on the outside of the skull. The researcher begins by
mapping the major areas of a subject's brain using an MRI
(magneticresonanceimaging)scan, andthenproceedstose-
lectivelyshutoffverysmallareasofthesubject'sbrainusing
magnetic pulses. For example, TMS studies have replicated
the effects of certain types of seizure (Fujiki & Steward,
1997), and have examined the effects of stimulation of the
occipital cortex in patients with early-onset blindness, nd-
ing that sensory areas deprived of input begin to function in
other sensory modalities (Kujala, Alho, & Naatanen, 2000).
TMS can even trigger anomalous emotional responses; after
inhibition of the prefrontal cortex via TMS, visual stimuli
that might normally trigger a sad response were much more
likely to cause a happy reaction, even laughing (Padberg,
2001).
Such methods provide a way for neuroscientists and psy-
chologists to circumvent the lack of sufcient data from
lesion studies. Much of cognitive neuropsychology is re-
stricted in this way, forcing researchers to search through
lengthy hospital records and medical journals for patients
suffering from appropriate injuries. Even worse, appropri-
ate patients may continue to go unnoticed, as some studies
may require nely differentiated neurological decits that
would not normally be tested for by hospital staff. By us-
ing TMS in an attempt to mimic the effects of brain damage,
researchers gain the ability to manufacture new case stud-
ies, and use this new data to establish or undermine theories
regarding the functional architecture of the human brain.
TMS success depends on the precise functioning of the
machinery; if subjects undergoing the procedure do not ac-
tually experience appropriate inhibition of the brain area
under consideration, then the results of a study may be
useless. Unfortunately there are few guarantees in TMS
research. The machinery inhibits neural activity through
burstsofelectromagnetismwhichsendtheneuronsintosuch
a frenzy of activity that normal ring patterns are impossi-
ble. This effectively disrupts activity in the area under the
pulse, but may not actually mimic the effect of a conven-
tional lesion. Similarly, varying the frequency of the elec-
tromagnetic pulse may change the resultant effect on the
subject. Finally, the pulse is only intended to affect brain
areas which are near to the skull surface; however, the pulse
penetrates beyond these areas, and the effect of this excess
inhibition is not fully understood. Despite these shortcom-
ings, however,use ofTMS to simulate brain dysfunctionhas
become a rapidly growing area of research within psychol-
ogy and neuroscience.
The data derived from TMS is clearly strongly theory-
dependent. Using this data as a way of settling empirical
questions regarding the brain function of normal people re-
quires researchers to sign up to a backstory. This back-
story is an account that lumps TMS data and regular lesion
data together as examples of real brain-damage data. De-
spite the fact that TMS brain damage data is articial, it will
remain admissible if neuroscientists read this articiality in
the sense of Articial1: a man-madeexample of somethingnatural. Neuroscientists would reject TMS if they only re-
garded TMS brain damage as Articial2: something that
has been designed to closely resemble something else.
Neuroscience Studies of Rats
Studies of rats are very common within the eld of neuro-
science, given that rat brains are much less problematic to
examineandanalysethanhumanbrains. Ideally,researchers
wouldbe ableto make non-invasive,in situ recordingsofthe
neural activity of free-living rats as they go about their nor-
mal everyday behaviour. Unfortunately, such recordings are
currently beyond the state of the art. In their place, neu-
roscientists must often rely upon studies of articially pre-
pared rat brains or portions of rat brain, e.g., to determine
the neural pathways that are used during various cognitive
functions.
A study of neurons in the medial geniculate body of the
rat provides a useful example (Peruzzi, Bartlett, Smith, &
Oliver, 1997). Rats in this study were anaesthetised and dis-
sected, then slices of the cortex were stimulated directly af-
ter preparation in this way. This particular study aimed to
determine the possible varieties of connections within the
main auditory pathway of the rat, and by extension the pos-
sible structure of the human auditory pathway.
Many neuroscientists would not see any problem with the
empirical validity of this type of procedure, and it is cer-
tainly the case that one cannot currently identify specic
connections between neurons without some sort of similar
intervention. However, the behaviour of cortical cells in a
preserved culture is certainly not the same as the behaviour
that the same cells would exhibit during their normal func-
tioning. The whole brain provides an array of stimulation to
the area of cortex in question, and this stimulation is mod-
ied by a structured external environment which is itself
inuenced by rat behaviour. Adaptive behaviour research
places a great deal of importance on this notion of embodi-
ment and situatedness, arguing that an organism's coupling
to its environment is vital to that organism's cognition and
behaviour (Brooks, 1991). If this argument holds, then in
somesense neurosciencestudiesofthe kinddescribedabove
could be accused of generating and recording articial neu-
rological data. In what way do these data apply to real rat
behaviour?
In fact, research in this vein proceeds on the assump-
tion that removal of the rat from the environment may ac-
tually increase the experimental validity of the study, since
in this way environmental or observer interference can be
minimised. The absorption or expulsion of chemicals by in-
dividualneuronscan be monitoredand cataloguedwith high
precision, very accurate readings of neuronal activity can be
taken very easily, and experimenter mistakes will likely be
more apparent. Additionally, the neuroscience community
must hold, perhaps tacitly, that any articiality introduced
by their experimental procedures (the extent to which the
behaviour of rat neurons changes when the rat is removed
from its normal environment, or, in this extreme case, the
rat's brain is removedfrom the rat) is only Articiality1, and
hence acceptable.
Discussion
The two examples above demonstrate that relatively ortho-
dox empirical tools are never-the-lesstheory dependent,and
that this dependenceneed be neither straightforward nor ex-
plicitly understood. The grounds upon which the TMS and
rat studies described above are considered valid methods of
collecting data on real brain function are neither formal nor
conclusive, but rather constitute a kind of working hypoth-
esis supported by a tacit framework of assumptions. The
fact that empirical tools can be employed in the absence of
a strict account of their validity is welcome news for strong
articial life, since a workable denition of what is to count
as living andwhat is not appearsto be some way off. But the
fact that empirical tools do appear to rely on some agreed-
upon backstory begs the question: what sort of backstory
might similarly support strong articial life research?
First and foremost, this backstory must offer a convinc-
ing (to the Alife community, at least) account of why arti-
cial life deserves to be understood as a source of Articial1
data, rather than merely Articial2 data. That is, articial
life must count as man-made life, rather than merely resem-
bling life to some extent.
How might this be achieved? Both TMS and rat neuro-
science offer the same suggestion. Propose an empirical
procedure that starts with a non-controversial example of
the class of systems one wishes to explore (e.g., brains) and
prepare it in a manner that makes it amenable to empirical
investigation. Then argue that any effects of the prepara-
tion procedure (e.g., zapping with electromagnetism; anaes-
thetising, slicing, and shocking; etc.) are neutral, or benign
orcanbe controlledfor. Hence,despite the fact thatprepara-
tion introduces a gap between the object of enquiry and the
subject of experimentation, researchers can still claim that
the latter offers a window onto the former, although one that
is somewhat indirect.
In fact, this is an approach to preparing articial life al-
ready taken within some elds, e.g., AI (Articial Insemi-
nation): start by getting hold of some real male and female
gametes from the species you wish to articially synthesise
(uncontroversially,we typically take these gametes to be ca-
pable of becomingalive) and articially bring them together
in a way that encourages a new living creature to develop.
A similar story underpins other forms of manufactured life,
e.g., clones, or mutant lifeforms such as various experimen-
tal strains of drosophila.
So far, this approach appears analogous to the manufac-
ture of lime avour through processing real limesif this
processing is not regarded as somehow debasing or pollut-
ing, one might feel justied in using the term real limeavour to describe such a product. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach will not satisfy a central goal of strong articial life:
the generation of entirely new datasets. Any articial life
produced in this way will be inherently related to existing
life. We will not be able to signicantly augment the dataset
upon which theoretical biology can draw through this ap-
proach.1 Indeed regular biology regards synthesised life of
this type (cloned sheep, mutant ies) as straightforwardly
falling within its standard remit.
However, the preparation that is typically involved in
Alife computer simulation appears to be of an entirely dif-
ferent character. Alife researchers typically begin with a
system that appears to be entirely removed from the liv-
ingsystemsthat theyseektoinvestigateanunprogrammed
computer. The preparation that this machine undergoes is
some kind of programming, which takes place in a largely
idiosyncratic and informal fashion, by contrast with stan-
dardised practices in experimental neuroscience. Rather
than merely being intended to make the system amenable
to controlled observation and recording, this kind of prepa-
ration appears to bear the entire burden of animating the
computerbringingit tolife. As suchit wouldbehardtoar-
gue that this type of preparationis neutral or benign. Rather,
it is substantive, and hence suspicious.
Thus, the gap between the class of living things and the
Alife systems built to generate empirical data on them looks
pretty wide. Rather than being a window onto life-as-it-
could-be, from this perspective articial life might appear to
be quintessentially articial2an attempt to make one thing
look like something else. Can this be remedied?
One example of an alternative route is offered by Newell
& Simon (1976). Rather than deriving man-made intelli-
gencefromuncontroversialexamplesofnaturalintelligence,
they commence from a more radical position, arguing that
computers meet the necessary and sufcient conditions for
intelligence by virtue of being, along with brains, physi-
cal symbol systems. Once this is established, any computer
can be considered to be only a suitable programming away
from being a bona de example of real intelligence. Notice
that Newell and Simon do not rely on particular similari-
ties between the behaviour or structure of AI systems and
natural intelligences. Rather, they attempt to establish rst
principles from which to demonstrate a fundamental equiv-
alence between computation and intelligence. On this view,
programming a computer is just the same kind of prepara-
tion employed in orthodox empirical scienceit is a way
of subjecting computation/intelligenceto controlled, critical
examination. How might articial life follow this lead?
Langton (1992) posits that life is some kind of informa-
1An alternative tack also fails for a similar reason. Real lime
avour might be successfully manufactured through building an
exact copy of real lime molecules and mixing them together in the
right way. But this type of synthesis will not produce new data, it
simply reproduces existing data.
tionecologyinlivingsystems, a dynamicsofinformation
has gained control over the dynamics of energy, which de-
terminesthebehaviorofmostnon-livingsystems(Langton,
1992, p.41). Perhaps this notion (or a previous version of it,
Dupuy,2000)could be elaborateduponto forman appropri-
ate framework for strong articial life?
1. An information ecology provides the necessary and
sufcient conditions for life.
2. A suitably programmed computer is an example of
an information ecology.
Under such an account, an Alife simulation would be re-
garded as an instance of an information ecology, and thus
a manifestation of life, rather than merely a facsimile of
it. The unprogrammed computer becomes a system that is
potentially alive, given the appropriate conditions. Just as
Newell and Simon view the computer as simply needing the
right type of program in order to realise its potential for in-
telligent action, strong articial life proponents might view
the computer as similar to an unfertilised egg, needing only
the correct stimulation (i.e., appropriate information) to re-
alise its potential for life. From this perspective, the gap
between the object of enquiry and the subject of experimen-
tation not only narrows, but entirely disappears; Alife be-
comes a means for gathering data on real digital life, rather
than a means for producing behaviours similar to biological
life.
This paper should not be read as necessarily endorsing
this particular accountor indeed the wider project of empiri-
cal articial life. Rather, we hope to have demonstrated that
if empirical articial life is to proceed, it will require some
set of agreed-upon assumptions that perform the same role
as Langton's. They must motivate the notion that a com-
puter is more than merely capable of being a life-supporting
medium (like organic molecules), but rather the far more
problematic assertion that computation is intrinsic to life.
Summary
Here, we have considered the potential for strong articial
life to settle empirical questions regarding the nature of life
despite the absence of a unifyingtheory of life itself. Unfor-
tunately,anydatadrawnfromanarticial lifestudywould
appear to be strongly theory dependent, i.e., whether or not
one considers the behaviour of an articial life system to
constitute Articial1 life or Articial2 life hinges critically
on whether one signs up to an appropriate backstory or
rationale.
We have seen that less controversial empirical tools also
suffer strong theory-dependence,yet are in common use de-
spite the absence of an explicit, formal, conclusive account
of their validity. What underwrites the use of these tools is
an informal set of tacit assumptions convincing experimen-
talists that, while the tool may not be a direct window ontothe phenomena of interest, any attendant indirectness is not
problematic. However, it appears that the kind of frame-
works that support the scientic use of these tools will not
help support strong articial life. The validity of TMS and
rat neuroscience studies stems from the fact that the start-
ing point for these empirical procedures are uncontroversial
examples of the systems they are intended to generate data
on. (Although the procedures that are applied could be ac-
cusedofintroducingarticiality,thecommunitythatemploy
these types of technique regard this kind of preparation
as non-problematic.) As a result, any data generated from
these procedures is intimately linked to these uncontrover-
sial examplesit is this link from which the validity of the
procedure emanates. If articial life is intended to gener-
ate new datasets that are independent of, or distinct from,
life-as-we-know-it, this will not do. Indeed, when articial
life is derived from living things, as in cloning, the results
are regarded as part of terrestrial biology, not as some dis-
tinct kind of life.
In light of this, it appears that strong articial life will
require some theory of life to be in place before it can com-
mence. This theory might follow Newell & Simon (1976)
in taking the form of an argumentthat computation is a kind
of life. From this position, it would be possible to gener-
ate articial life that was independent from terrestrial life,
yet real in the sense of Articial1. The equation of life and
computationis a formidable undertaking,yet articial life is
in possession of a few candidate theories that could act as
the seeds of such an account. For instance, Langton's notion
of living systems as those in which a dynamics of informa-
tion has gained control over the dynamics of energy (Lang-
ton, 1992, p.41) may be one such seed. However, such Alife
ideasmustdevelopandmatureconsiderablybeforewearein
the enviable position of, say, articial light researchers, who
rely upon a well-founded theory that allows them to gener-
ate light in entirely novel ways, yet feel secure in claiming
this to be real light, not Articial2 light. There is of course
no stipulation that such a theory of computation/lifeneed be
correct. Ultimately, it will be the articial life community
who will decide whether or not any candidate theory is suf-
ciently compelling.
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